









Offsetting for International Aviation  
The State of Play of











           
            
        
            










       





          
Disclaimer
The positions expressed in this paper are strictly those of the authors and represent
neither the opinion of the Wuppertal Institute nor of the German Federal Ministry
for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety.
The Wuppertal Institute is carrying out the “JIKO”-project on behalf of the German 







Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy
Döppersberg 19 • 42103 Wuppertal • Germany
www.wupperinst.org
February 2016












The State of Play of Market- 
Based Measures under ICAO  






   
  
   
  
   





   
  
  








1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1
 
2 Who Is Responsible? ICAO vs. UNFCCC ....................................................................... 2
 
2.1 Unequal Siblings of the UN Family: UNFCCC and ICAO ............................................................................ 2
 
2.2 Carbon Neutral Growth.................................................................................................................................... 4
 
2.3 Market-Based Measures ................................................................................................................................... 5
 
2.4 Scale of Emissions to Be Covered by MBM ................................................................................................... 6
 
3 Options for Market-based Measures .......................................................................... 8
 
3.1 Emissions Trading or Offsetting ..................................................................................................................... 8
 
3.2 Options for Differentiation .............................................................................................................................. 8
 
3.2.1 The Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities ..................................................8
 
3.2.2 The Principles of Non-discrimination and Equal and Fair Opportunities to Develop
 
International Aviation ............................................................................................................................................. 9
 
3.2.3 Route-based Differentiation .................................................................................................................. 9
 
3.3 State of Play of ICAO Negotiations ............................................................................................................. 10
 
4 ICAO’s MBM and the CDM Experience ...................................................................... 11
 
4.1 Will there be enough supply? ....................................................................................................................... 11
 
4.2 The CDM: A Learning Mechanism............................................................................................................... 12
 
5 ICAO’s Global MBM and the Paris Agreement.......................................................... 13
 


























While the states of world have adopted a new 
international climate change agreement in Paris 
last December, two important sectors remain 
largely exempt: international aviation and ship­
ping. The designated UN bodies, the Interna­
tional Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and In­
ternational Maritime Organisation (IMO) are 
developing their own mitigation measures.
In this JIKO Policy Brief we focus on the negotia­
tions under ICAO. The paper provides an over­
view of the history of climate change mitigation 
in the aviation sector and takes stock of the ne­
gotiation process that is to culminate in the es­
tablishment of a global market-based measure 
(MBM). Subsequently, we discuss the proposed 
MBM in the light of experiences with the UN­
FCCC’s own offsetting mechanism, the CDM,
and the ongoing negotiations of the Paris 
Agreement.
ICAO has set itself two aspirational goals to 
combat climate change: to increase fleet fuel 
efficiency by 2% per annum and to achieve car­
bon neutral growth after 2020, i.e. to cap net 
emissions of the aviation sector based on the 
emissions of that year. This latter is to be 
achieved by means of a mandatory global off­
setting scheme, which is meant to compensate 
any excess emissions that cannot be abated di­
rectly. 
ICAO has mandated the ICAO Council to devel­
op this global MBM. Current negotiations are 
taking place under the Environmental Advisory 
Group that coordinates the negotiation process 
and deals with relevant policy issues and two 
technical working groups, one dealing with eli­
gibility criteria for emission units (EUC) and the 
other dealing with provision for measuring, re­
porting and verification (MRV) of aircraft emis­
sions.
Both working groups have made considerable 
progress, but especially the discussions of the 
EUC group so far remain rather on an abstract 
level and detailed provisions of a governance 
structure are so far lacking.
From the discussion of ICAOs proposed global
MBM in the light of the CDM experience and 
the ongoing negotiations under the UNFCCC,
we draw four key lessons for ICAO and the de­
sign of its global MBM:
Supply is abundant: The aviation industry has 
expressed concerns over high prices due to lim­
ited availability of emission units. The CDM ex­
perience shows that there is no basis for this
concern. ICAO should therefore focus on high­
quality offsets only.
Environmental integrity is key to maintain 
the credibility of the mechanism: ICAO
should restrict eligible emission units to credits 
with highest standards with respect to envi­
ronmental integrity and strong contributions to 
sustainable development.
An effective governance structure is re­
quired: The CDM benefitted greatly from its 
learning-by-doing approach. The CDM Execu­
tive Board resolutely worked out the details of 
the mechanism. Without this (political) en­
gagement, the CDM would have risked to erode 
its credibility ultimately leading to a lack of po­
litical support.
ICAO should establish close ties to the UN­
FCCC in order to address issues arising from the 
accounting framework to the Paris Agreement.
Unless the clear rules for accounting of emis­
sion reductions and transfer of emission units 
are incorporated in the ‘fine print’ to the new
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1 Introduction  
In order to avoid dangerous climate change 
and limit global warming to below 2°C it is re­
quired to reduce global greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions by 40-70% below 2010 levels by 2050 
and to (at least) zero in 2100 (IPCC, 2014). Under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) countries have 
adopted a new global treaty in Paris that, if im­
plemented, can pave the way for the funda­
mental transformation of global socio­
economic systems required to achieve this goal.
While the national contributions communicat­
ed in the context of these negotiations thus far 
fall short off the task (Hood, Adkins, & Lavina,
2015; Climate Action Tracker, 2015), two im­
portant sectors are virtually exempt from miti­
gation efforts negotiated under UNFCCC: inter­
national aviation and shipping, representing 
roughly 1.5% (478 Mt CO2) and 1.9% (602 Mt
CO2) of global energy-related CO2 emissions in 
2012 respectively (IEA, 2014). However, particu­
larly the activity level of the aviation sector is 
deemed to increase dramatically. While gov­
ernments are preparing an agreement to re­
duce domestic emissions from both developed 
and developing countries, emissions from in­
ternational aviation are projected to increase 
threefold until 2050 (Lee, Lim, & Owen, 2013; 
Owen, Lee, & Lim, 2010).
Advancing climate change mitigation for the 
aviation sector has proven difficult in the recent 
past. While the issue of climate change is nego­
tiated under the auspices of the UNFCCC, there 
is also a dedicated UN body that is tasked to 
regulate international aviation: the Internation­
al Civil Aviation Association (ICAO).
The UNFCCC has repeatedly asked the ICAO to 
develop a plan to mitigate emissions from the 
sector. Still, progress has been slow. In 2010, the 
37th ICAO Assembly has agreed to two aspira­
tional goals: to improve fuel efficiency by 2%
annually, and to cap net emission growth of the 
sector at 2020 levels (commitment to carbon 
neutral growth) (ICAO, 2010). This latter goal is 
to be achieved by means of a basket of 
measures including through aircraft technolo­
gy, operational improvements, and sustainable 
alternative fuels. However, the combined effect 
of those measures is recognized by all stake­
holders to be insufficient to make up for the 
strong expected growth for the sector. Hence,
member states have agreed to develop “mar­
ket-based measures” (MBM) at ICAO Assembly 
38 in 2013 that can compensate the remaining 
emissions (ICAO, 2013a).
This JIKO Policy Brief gives an overview of the 
history of climate change mitigation in the avia­
tion sector under both UNFCCC and ICAO and 
takes stock of the negotiation process that is to 
culminate in the establishment of a global mar­
ket-based measure, most likely a single global
offsetting scheme.
Furthermore, the different options for market­
based measures are briefly described. Also, the 
state of play of the negotiations for a global
MBM under the various ICAO bodies is summa­
rized with special emphasis on the proposed 
provisions on requirements for emission meas­
urement, reporting, and verification (MRV) and 
eligibility criteria for emission units (EUC). 
Finally we will discuss the proceedings of ICAO
in the light of the vast experience with market­
based mitigation instruments under the UN­
FCCC, namely the Clean Development Mecha­
nism (CDM), and the ongoing negotiations for a 
comprehensive international climate agree­






















2 Who Is Responsible?  
ICAO vs. UNFCCC  
2.1 Unequal Siblings of the UN 
Family: UNFCCC and ICAO
The core responsibility for mitigating climate 
change rests with the UNFCCC. However, the 
UNFCCC has historically approached its task fol­
lowing the principle of territoriality. This makes 
it difficult to account for aviation emissions. In
the Kyoto Protocol, emissions from domestic 
aviation were included under the emission caps 
set for developing countries listed in Annex B of 
the Kyoto Protocol. However, emissions from
international aviation, i.e. emissions from air­
crafts that depart from an airport in one country 
and arrive at an airport of another country, 
where not included, as it is extremely difficult to
clearly and uniquely separate and attribute the 
emissions to the inventory of one of the coun­
tries. 
Because of these difficulties, the UNFCCC re­
sorted in the Kyoto Protocol to referring the is­
sue of international aviation (and shipping) to 
the designated UN body: ICAO (and the Interna­
tional Maritime Organisation – IMO). Article 2.2 
of the protocol states  
The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limi­
tation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse 
gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol
from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working 
through the International Civil Aviation Organi­
zation and the International Maritime Organiza­
tion, respectively.  (UNFCCC, 1997)
One year earlier, the ICAO had requested the 
IPCC in collaboration with the Scientific As­
sessment Panel to the Montreal Protocol to 
prepare a special report. In 1999, the report Avi­
ation and the Global Atmosphere was published 
and highlighted that  
 aviation traffic and emissions had grown 
significantly and was projected to experi­
ence strong continued growth;
 aviation accounted for roughly 2% of an­
thropogenic CO2 emissions; 
 aircraft emissions at high altitudes trigger 
the formation of condensation trails and 
cirrus clouds further contributing to cli­
mate change so that the greenhouse effect 
of those high altitude emissions (radiative 
forcing) is substantially larger than ground­
level CO2 emissions (IPCC, 1999).
Note that the mandate provided by the Kyoto-
Protocol does not include the additional green­
house effects of high-altitude emissions, but 
does include other greenhouse gases – relevant 
are NOx emissions that produce ozone at high 
altitudes (IPCC, 1999). The latter are not ad­
dressed by ICAO to date.
Although earlier versions of the draft negotiat­
ing text of the Paris Agreement contained a 
formulation similar to the Kyoto Protocol’s
mentioning of international bunker fuels for 
aviation and shipping, this formulation was lat­
er dropped.
Despite these developments, ICAO made only 
limited progress on any mandatory policies to 
curb aviation emissions. On the occasion of the 
32nd ICAO Assembly in 1998, responding to the 
Kyoto Protocol request, ICAO decided through 
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tection (CAEP) to “study policy options to limit
aviation GHG taking into account the findings 
of the 1999 IPCC Report and report back to the 
Assembly at its next session three years later” 
(T&E, 2010, p. 11).
Subsequent ICAO meetings where not much 
more productive with respect to mandatory 
policies. In 2001 the ICAO Assembly postulated 
that “environmental levies on air transport 
which States may introduce should be in the 
form of charges rather than taxes” effectively 
cancelling any attempts to introduce fuel taxes 
as a means of mitigating aviation emissions 
(T&E, 2010, p. 12). Instead it endorsed the de­
velopment of an emissions trading scheme for 
global aviation and requested the ICAO Council
to develop guidelines for such a scheme. 
However, the idea of an aviation specific emis­
sion trading scheme was later discarded and 
the 2004 ICAO Assembly backtracked from its 
earlier resolution now only endorsing a volun­
tary trading system. 
At the next ICAO Assembly in autumn 2007, a 
Group on International Aviation Climate Change
(GIACC) was formed and tasked with the devel­
opment of a programme of action on climate 
change for ICAO in the run-up of the Copenha­
gen UNFCCC conference. The GIACC proposed 
an aspirational goal of an increase of fleet fuel 
efficiency of two per cent per annum. However,
the GIACC was not able to reach consensus on 
any market-based measures to mitigate avia­
tion emissions.
Finally, in 2010 at the 37th ICAO Assembly two
aspirational goals where agreed upon (ICAO, 
2010):
1.	 To improve fleet fuel efficiency by two%
per annum;
2.	 To keeping the global net carbon emis­
sions from international aviation from 
2020 at the same level (Carbon Neutral
Growth goal).
Both goals, however, do not attribute any spe­















Figure 1: Contribution of Measures for Reducing International Aviation Net CO2 Emissions. Source: ICAO, 2015b.
2.2 Carbon Neutral Growth 
Strong influence from the aviation industry 
made sure that there would not be an absolute 
cap on the growth of the aviation sector. In­
stead, the concept of carbon neutral growth 
was put forward (T&E, 2010). At its 32nd Assem­
bly, ICAO agreed to cap net global aviation 
emissions at 2020 levels from that year on.
This goal is to be achieved through a basket of 
measures:
Improved fuel efficiency: The two goals are 
intertwined; progress on the fuel efficiency goal
has direct impacts on and supports compliance 
with the second goal. The contributions re­
quired from other measures to achieve the car­
bon neutral growth goal hinges on the imple­
mentation of the fuel efficiency.
Operational improvements are promoted by 
ICAO such as allowing for continuous climb op­
erations, optimizing flight levels, better­
coordinated air traffic management, alternative 
routes that cut down travel time and distance, 
and improved ground operations (Gençsü & 
Hino, 2015; ICAO, 2013b). According to ICAO,
these improvements are necessary anyway to 
accommodate the expected growth, but can 
also contribute to limit aviation emissions. 
Sustainable alternative fuels shall be further 
developed and made available commercially at 
the large scale. An Alternative Fuels Task Force
has been established under the ICAO Council’s 
CAEP. To date sustainable alternative fuels are 
not available commercially at the large scale,
but first successful operations have been car­
ried out blending conventional fuel with up to 
50% alternative fuels (ICAO, 2013b). ICAO esti­
mates that sustainable alternative fuels may 
supply a maximum of three per cent of total in­
ternational aviation fuel by 2020. However, the 
environmental performance of alternative fuels 
was found to vary greatly for different produc­
tion processes and evidence suggests that cur­
rently large-scale biofuel production produces 
environmental harm and contributes to poor 
social conditions (Upham, Tomei, & Boucher,
2009).
Market-based measures (MBM) will be used































mitigated through these measures and exceed 
the benchmark of 2020 emission levels.
2.3 Market-Based Measures 
At the 37th ICAO Assembly, a list of 16 guiding 
principles for such MBM were also agreed upon 
and listed in an annex to resolution A37-19 
(ICAO, 2010) including inter alia that:
 MBMs should support sustainable devel­
opment of the international aviation sec­
tor; 
 MBMs should be transparent and adminis­
tratively simple; 
 MBMs should be cost-effective;
 MBMs should not be duplicative and inter­
national aviation CO2 emissions should be 
accounted for only once; 
 MBMs should minimize carbon leakage 
and market distortions; 
 MBMs should not impose inappropriate 
economic burden on international avia­
tion;
 MBMs should be assessed in relation to 
various measures on the basis of perfor­
mance measured in terms of CO2 emis­
sions reductions or avoidance, where ap­
propriate;
 MBMs should take into account the princi­
ple of common but differentiated respon­
sibilities and respective capabilities, the 
special circumstances and respective ca­
pabilities, and the principle of non­
discrimination and equal and fair opportu­
nities.
At its 38th Assembly, ICAO decided to mandate 
the Council develop a mandatory global MBM
based on the guiding principles (ICAO, 2013a).
At its first subsequent meeting the Council has 
set up two working groups to carry out the po­
litical and technical work programme:
Offsetting for International Aviation 
The Environmental Advisory Group (EAG) is 
tasked to coordinate and oversee the work on a 
global MBM. It is set up directly under the aus­
pices of the Council and is supposed to focus 
on the policy aspects of the development pro­
cess. The EAG is to comprise 17 ICAO member 
states with both a wide geographical and de­
veloped / developing world representation: Ar­
gentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, India, Ita­
ly, Japan, Mexico, Russian Federation,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Tanzania, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United 
States. 
The technical work is carried out by a dedicated 
Global Market-based Measure Technical Task 
Force (GMTF). This task force is set up as a sub­
group under the Council’s Committee on Avia­
tion Environment Protection (CAEP), a body 
that has been established already in 1983 as a 
technical committee that assists the Council in
formulating new policies and standards related 
to aircraft noise and emissions, and more gen­
erally to aviation environmental impact. 
The GMTF has organised its work in two sepa­
rate subgroups focusing on eligibility criteria 
for emission units under a global MBM (Emis­
sion Units Criteria: EUC subgroup) and a second 
group tasked to draft modalities and proce­
dures for measuring, reporting and verifying 
emissions (MRV subgroup).
The EUC subgroup shall:
 Review existing criteria for emission units 
used in offsetting CO2 emissions, including 
but not limited to, quality assurance prin­
ciples; methodology approval processes;
approved project or program types; unit is­
suance, transfer and registration require­
ments; and validation and verification re­
quirements.
 Evaluate how, and under what criteria,
emission units from existing or proposed 
MBMs could be used in a global MBM 
scheme for international civil aviation.
 Undertake an assessment of the future 





















































Committee on Aviation 
Environmental Protection (CAEP) 
supervision 
Coordinates and oversees the 
development of a global MBM proposal. 
Focuses on international policy aspects. 











































































































































































































































Deals with technical aspects, economic 
and environmental impacts, and 
modalities in two subgroups: 
[1] Developing eligibility criteria of 
emissions units (allowances, offsets). 
[2] Developing modalities for an MRV 
regime that ensures robust accounting of 
aviation CO2 emissions. 
   
Lukas Hermwille 
Figure 2: Governance Structure and Timeline of the MBM Proposal Development Process. Source: own illustration.
and proposed MBMs with respect to the 
potential needs of the international civil
aviation sector and assess the impact of in­
ternational civil aviation on the carbon 
market supply, demand and price. 
The MRV group’s work includes the following 
key elements:
 Scope and coverage of the MRV scheme to 
support an international aviation global
MBM;
 Monitoring of international aviation emis­
sions;
 Reporting of international aviation emis­
sions;
 Verification of international aviation emis­
sions prior to reporting;
 Relationship of emissions monitoring, re­
porting and verification steps with the ad­
ministration of the obligation for offsetting 
emissions.
Both subgroups are to prepare draft provisions 
for the 10th regular CAEP meeting in February 
2016. The CAEP recommendations will then be 
discussed both on the occasion of the formal 
ICAO Council meeting in May / June 2016 and 
at a separate high-level ICAO meeting in the 
run-up to the 39th ICAO Assembly from 27 Sep­
tember till 7 October 2016 where the global 
MBM is supposed to be finally agreed (ICAO,
2015b).
The governance structure and timeline of the 
process for the development of a global MBM is 
illustrated in figure 2 above. 
2.4 Scale of Emissions to Be 
Covered by MBM
As outlined in the introduction, emissions of the 
aviation sector are projected to rise substantial­
ly over the coming decades. According to ICAO,
international aviation is expected to grow (ex­
pressed in revenue tonne kilometres – RTK) at 
an average rate of 4.6% per annum until 2050 
(ICAO, 2013b). If the aspirational goal for in­
creased fuel efficiency is achieved, the increase 
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of between 288-376 Mt CO2 in 2030 and 590­
816 Mt CO2 in 2040 . Over the period from 2021 
till 2035, the potential demand adds up to 
roughly 3300 Mt CO2 (Lee et al., 2013; Cames, 
2015). To put this into perspective, aggregate 
offset demand in the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme has been estimated to 1650 Mt CO2 
over the 2008-2020 period (Bellassen, Stephan,
& Leguet, 2012).
A portion of this demand may also be covered 
through the use of sustainable alternative fuels.
ICAO has solicited targets for the use of alterna­
tive fuels from member states and observer or­
ganisations. These targets add up to about 25% 
of the projected emissions gap by 2050 (ICAO, 
2013b). However, given negative experiences 
with environmental harm and deteriorating so­
cial conditions in the context of biofuel produc­
tion (Upham et al., 2009), the projections for al­
ternative fuels are subject to high uncertainties. 
Even ‘speculative’ levels of use of alternative 
fuels will not be sufficient to achieve the carbon 



















3 Options for Market-based  
Measures  
3.1 Emissions Trading or Offset­
ting 
Under the ICAO negotiations, the conceptual
basis of the proposed Global Market-based 
Measure has not been elaborated in full detail. 
Preparatory work under ICAO (ICAO, 2013c) has 
identified three design options:
1.	 global mandatory offsetting,
2.	 global mandatory offsetting with reve­
nue, and  
3.	 global emissions trading.
With offsetting (Option 1), actual emissions are 
compensated through reduction, removal or 
avoidance of emissions elsewhere. For each ton 
of CO2 (or CO2 equivalent for other greenhouse 
gases), an emission unit is provided under a 
crediting mechanism or protocol. For each ton 
of aviation emissions to be offset, one emission 
unit has to be surrendered.
Offsetting with revenue (Option 2) differs from
option 1 only in the fact that a levy, fee or share 
of proceeds is generated that may be used for 
other purposes, e.g. compensating airlines from 
developing countries, funding research and de­
velopment on mitigation options in the avia­
tion sector, or to provide a continuous stream 
of revenue to fund the administrative structure 
of the global MBM.
In contrast to the first two options, emissions 
trading would impose a hard cap on the actual
emissions from the aviation sector. Specific avi­
ation allowances would be created and provid­
ed to the aircraft operators by means of auc­
tioning or free allocation. For each ton that the 
operators’ aircrafts emit, one allowance would 
have to be surrendered. Trading of allowances 
would be possible among carriers.
Officially, no decision with respect to the design 
options of the MBM could be reached. Conse­
quently, the GMTF has been tasked to develop 
both approaches. However, the aviation indus­
try has repeatedly expressed its preference for 
the offsetting variant and opposes the idea of
generating additional revenues through the 
mechanism. At its 38th Assembly, the ICAO has 
taken note of this position. It is therefore likely 
that the global MBM will take the form of man­
datory offsetting. 
In the remainder of this Policy Brief, we will 
therefore exclusively focus on the provisions 
with respect to offsetting mechanisms. 
3.2 Options for Differentiation
3.2.1	 The Principle of Common But Dif­
ferentiated Responsibilities 
It has been argued that progress on mitigating 
aviation emissions under ICAO has been ham­
pered by a set of conflicting principles (Mar­
tínez Romera & van Asselt, 2015). In article 2-1 
of the UNFCCC the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities is specified (CBDR):  
The Parties should protect the climate system for 
the benefit of present and future generations of 
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cordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Ac­
cordingly, the developed country Parties should 
take the lead in combating climate change and 
the adverse effects thereof. (United Nations,
1992) 
ICAO has explicitly acknowledged this principle 
in the context of its work (ICAO, 2013a).
In practice, this principle was operationalized in
a static division of countries in the Convention’s 
annexes: Developed countries are listed in An­
nex I. All countries not listed in this annex have 
been considered developing countries.
In the Kyoto Protocol, the principle of CBDR was 
operationalized in that only Annex I parties 
where formally obliged to limit or reduce their 
emissions. For the Paris agreement, more nu­
anced means to differentiate between coun­
tries will have to be found. 
The question of responsibility (and capability) is 
particularly difficult to assess in the case of in­
ternational aviation. Especially long-distance 
travel routes are usually operated to and from a 
relatively small number of large regional hubs.
Air traffic at these hubs is very international. For 
example, the airport of Singapore serves as a 
hub for South-east Asia. Given the small size of 
the country, Singaporean citizens make up only 
a small fraction of the passengers boarding air­
planes in Singapore. Should Singapore be re­
sponsible for all the emissions originating from 
flights to or from its airport?  
Furthermore, usually only relatively affluent 
people can afford to travel by airplane. One 
could therefore argue that whoever can afford 
traveling by plane is also capable of contrib­
uting to climate change mitigation.
3.2.2	 The Principles of Non­
discrimination and Equal and Fair 
Opportunities to Develop Inter­
national Aviation 
ICAO was established on the mandate of the 
Chicago Convention on International Aviation.
Article 1 of the Chicago Convention provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Convention, the 
laws and regulations of a contracting State re­
lating to the admission to or departure from its 
territory of aircraft engaged in international air 
navigation, or to the operation and navigation 
of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be 
applied to the aircraft of all contracting States 
without distinction as to nationality, and shall
be complied with by such aircraft upon entering 
or departing from or while within the territory of 
that State. (ICAO, 2006) 
In other words, there shall be no discrimination 
of any air carrier based on their country of 
origin.  
The conflict is evident: the principle of CBDR 
demands differentiation by country but the 
Chicago Convention prohibits discrimination by 
carrier based on their country of origin. A solu­
tion to this dilemma was proposed: route-based 
differentiation.
3.2.3	 Route-based Differentiation 
In the light of the Chicago Convention’s princi­
ples, the default option would be to have no
differentiation at all. This is, however, clearly not 
in line with the CBDR principle. To the contrary,
this would pose a burden on airlines from de­
veloping countries. Routes to and from emerg­
ing economies are projected to contribute the 
lion’s share of the aviation sector’s growth over 
the coming decades, whereas routes in Europe 
and Northern America are projected to remain 
stable. 
China, India, Russia, Egypt, Libya and Saudi Ara­
bia have proposed to use the historical emis­
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sions to determine each operator’s offsetting 
amount after 2020 based on the proportion of 
its own accumulative emissions in the period 
1992-2020 to the global accumulative emis­
sions in the same period (Yue, 2015). This pro­
posal would result in long established airlines 
from Europe and North America shouldering 
the biggest burden. 
A compromise proposal was put forward by 
Brazil and Argentina (Deng, 2015): Differentia­
tion would be implemented by route rather 
than by aircraft operator. The proposal foresees 
to establish two categories of countries:
1.	 developed or high income countries;
2.	 developing or mid/low income countries.
From these state categories three route catego­
ries are derived: 
i.	 routes from one high-income country to 
another;
ii.	 routes between a high income country and 
a mid/low income country;  
iii.	 routes from one to another mid/low in­
come country.
In a first step, the global offsetting obligation 
would be distributed among the three route 
categories. Subsequently, offset obligations will 
be distributed among routes (within each 
group). Finally, for each route the distribution 
will be defined for each operator serving that 
route.
Such an approach, while relatively complex to 
administer in the first place, would ensure that 
carriers operating on the same routes are treat­
ed exactly the same, no matter which countries 
they are registered in (Deng, 2015).
3.3 State of Play of ICAO Nego­
tiations 
ICAO has tasked two subgroups to work out the 
detailed provisions for a global MBM. The EUC 
subgroup mentioned above is tasked to devel­
op criteria for emissions units used for compli­
ance with the Carbon Neutral Growth Goal. It 
has developed a set of design elements and in­
tegrity assessment criteria building on and 
complementing the guiding principles outlined 
already in the annex to the 38th ICAO Assembly 
Resolution (ICAO, 2013a).
Likewise, the MRV subgroup of the GMTF has 
developed a set of recommendations.
Unfortunately, the negotiation process under 
ICAO is not very transparent. All documents are 
strictly confidential. Public scrutiny is severely 
restricted and limited to officially registered 
representatives. The details of the state of play 
under the various relevant negotiation streams 
therefore cannot be laid out in this Policy Brief.
The author has traced the discussion inter alia
by interviewing representatives from various 
delegations to the ICAO negotiations. The result
of this research cannot be recited here, but it
has been subject of consultations to the BMUB 
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4 ICAO’s MBM and the  
CDM Experience
4.1 Will there be enough sup­
ply? 
Industry representatives in the ICAO negotia­
tions repeatedly voiced concerns that an ICAO 
MBM might face a shortage of supply. There­
fore, in order to maximize supply, they pushed 
discussions under the GMTF towards a broad 
coverage of eligible mechanisms / schemes.
The design elements and eligibility criteria 
specified in section 3.3 are rather generic and 
could cover credits from various protocols.
Mostly, they focus on transparency and do not 
specify a process of continuous oversight.
However, experience with the CDM demon­
strates that with sufficiently high (expected) 
prices, there is abundant supply.
While the future of the CDM is unclear after 
2020 (see section 5 below), the mechanism has 
demonstrated the proficiency of crediting 
mechanisms: Recent research shows that CERs 
generated by current registered CDM projects 
could satisfy the aggregate demand of the avia­
tion sector (Cames, 2015). Even under rigorous 
quality restrictions, i.e. excluding all project 
types that raised environmental concerns and 
taking into account only recent vintages, the 
existing CDM pipeline can generate enough 
CERs to offset the entirety of the projected 














emission growth of international aviation for 
the period 2021 until 2035 (see figure 3) (ibid).
Given the current low CER prices, many CDM
projects have refrained from verifying emission 
reductions and / or requesting issuance of cred­
its. However, Warnecke et al. (2015), by survey­
ing a representative sample of over 1300 CDM
projects, found that the vast majority of CDM 
projects are still operating regularly. Only 15%
have permanently stopped their mitigation ac­
tivities. Also, a strong majority could return to 
regular operation including verification and is­
suance at rather moderate price levels: 53% of 
all projects could resume verification and issu­
ance activity at prices below EUR 5 per CER and 
82% at EUR 10 (ibid).
This research also shows that considerable ca­
pacities exist on the supply side. There is ample 
experience in applying the CDM’s tools and 
methodologies and this treasure trove will re­
main in the open space even if the CDM was 
completely shut down after 2020 without any 
form of transferring or transforming it in a dif­
ferent instrument. 
After an initial backlog and relatively long lead 
times for project registration, the CDM’s admin­
istrative infrastructure managed to register 
3236 projects representing annual emission re­
ductions of 364 Mt CO2e and estimated cumula­
tive emission reductions of 5.67 Gt CO2e until
2030 (UNEP DTU, 2015). This accomplishment is
even more impressive considering that the first 
CDM projects were registered by the end of 
2004 only. Within seven to eight years, the CDM
managed to build up capacities for designing 
and registering projects that are capable of sat­
isfying twice the expected accumulative de­
mand from international aviation. While a lot of 
the human capacities that contributed to this 
accomplishment are currently running idle due 
to the slump of CER prices, the history of the 
CDM has shown with confidence that sufficient 
supply will be available to satisfy ICAO’s de­
mand for offsets. 
4.2 The CDM: A Learning Mech­
anism 
The history of the CDM has also shown that off­
set crediting is a tricky business. Methodologies 
were developed that turned out to be inappli­
cable or, to the contrary, that where too gener­
ous or contained flaws in the assessment of the 
additionality of projects. The CDM has been 
confronted with criticism regarding its envi­
ronmental integrity, lack of contribution to sus­
tainable development, and high operational 
complexities.  
However, the transparency of the framework 
has allowed to identify loopholes and design 
failures and a continuous reform process has 
strongly improved the integrity of the mecha­
nism over time (Shishlov & Bellassen, 2012). For 
example, the geographical distribution of pro­
jects as well as the distribution among sectors 
was improved significantly with the introduc­
tion of Programmes of Activities and Standard­
ized Baselines; the Secretariat has streamlined 
the administrative processes and achieved a 
much more efficient management of the regis­
tration process; and dubious methodologies,
e.g. early versions of the methodology for the 
abatement of HFC emissions, were revised and 
improved to maintain environmental integrity. 
The CDM followed a ‘learning by doing’ para­
digm. This turned out to be key to maintain the 
mechanism’s credibility. Without its govern­
ance structure, the CDM Executive Board and its 
Panels and without a robust political mandate 
for those bodies, the early success of the CDM 
would have been impossible. The lesson to 
learn for ICAO here would be, that in order to 
maintain an integer and credible global MBM, it 
is necessary to have continuous oversight and 
to be prepared to take great care of the details 
as problems will almost certainly emerge and 
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5 ICAO’s Global MBM and  
the Paris Agreement
Under the UNFCCC, a new climate agreement 
has been agreed in Paris in December 2015 (for 
a detailed analysis see Obergassel et al., 2016).
The Paris Agreement does not explicitly men­
tion carbon markets, but enables market-based 
approaches in several ways. One distinct fea­
ture is a new mechanism which is to ”promote 
the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions 
while fostering sustainable development”
(UNFCCC, 2016, Paris Agreement, Art. 6.4; see 
also paras 37-40). While building on the experi­
ences of the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the scope of this mechanism is broad­
er in that it is not restricted to project-type ac­
tivities. Furthermore, it is to ”deliver an overall 
mitigation in global emissions”, thus going be­
yond the zero-sum game of the Kyoto Mecha­
nisms to date. The deviation from the Kyoto 
world is also mirrored in the fact that both de­
veloped and developing countries can use the 
mechanisms, leading to a kind of hybrid be­
tween the Clean Development Mechanism and 
Joint Implementation, respectively. Other fea­
tures of this mechanism include oversight by 
the UNFCCC, participation of public as well as 
private entities, and the prohibition of double 
counting (i.e. accounting for emission reduc­
tions at the same time in the inventories of the 
host country as well as in the budget of the re­
ceiving country).
The decision text tasks the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) 
with elaborating modalities and procedures for 
this mechanism (UNFCCC, 2016, paras 37–40).
The decision text names important principles in
this context, namely that reductions must be 
”real, measurable and long-term”. Further, re­
ductions must be additional, relate to yet-to-be 
defined ‘specific scopes’ of activities, and be 
verified and certified by designated operational 
entities (DOEs).  
Moreover, the Paris Agreement allows Parties to 
conduct “cooperative approaches.” (UNFCCC,
2016, Paris Agreement, Art. 6.2). Under these,
mitigation outcomes can be “internationally
transferred” and “used” against nationally de­
termined contributions. The respective article 
6.2 names environmental integrity, transparen­
cy and robust accounting as the core principles 
guiding these approaches, while UNFCCC over­
sight is not foreseen. Instead, the Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to the Paris Agreement (CMA) is to develop 
dedicated guidance.
To what extent these two approaches will actu­
ally be utilized remains to be seen. A couple of 
countries have indicated to use carbon markets 
in order to achieve some of their mitigation 
contribution. However, most of these countries 
are developing countries or emerging econo­
mies that have pledged to increase their mitiga­
tion ambition on the condition that they re­
ceive financial support through carbon markets.
Only a small number of countries have indicat­
ed that they are willing to buy credits in addi­
tion to domestic mitigation. Even the EU, who 
has been a strong proponent of international
carbon markets in the past, also has formulated 
its INDC in terms of a purely domestic mitiga­
tion goal, the use of international emission 












The CDM, being an instrument of the Kyoto 
Protocol, was not transferred to the Paris 
Agreement. Future technical negotiations will 
determine whether existing CDM projects can 
be transferred to the newly established mecha­
nism referred to above. Therefore, it would not 
be appropriate for ICAO to exclusively rely on 
existing UNFCCC mechanisms at this point of
time.  
However, the ongoing negotiations under UN­
FCCC remain of vital importance for any ICAO 
decision. One of ICAO’s own eligibility and in­
tegrity criteria is the avoidance of double 
counting. The Paris Agreement has created a 
significantly different structure than the Kyoto 
Protocol including the need for a very different 
type of accounting framework.
Under the Kyoto Protocol accounting frame­
work, the binding mitigation obligations of de­
veloped countries were translated into as­
signed amount units (AAUs). Each developed 
country only complies with its obligation if it 
can provide one AAU per ton of its actual emis­
sions. Developing countries did not have any 
obligations and thus no AAUs. The world was 
thus divided into a capped environment (de­
veloped countries with assigned amounts) and 
an uncapped environment (developing coun­
tries). The CDM was introduced as a mechanism 
to generate and certify emission reductions in
the uncapped environment. 
The structure of the negotiations on Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) at 
its core already determined that the world will 
look much different in the new Agreement. The 
majority of countries has formulated their INDC
in terms of nation-wide mitigation contribu­
tions, but these contributions will not be con­
verted into assigned amounts. Moreover, not all
countries have communicated their contribu­
tions in terms of absolute emission goals. Alter­
native metrics are intensity goals (emissions per 
units of GDP), or reductions below a business­
as-usual scenario (see also Kreibich & 
Obergassel, 2016).
Under all of these nation-wide contributions 
the same problem arises: Any mitigation activi­
ty will count towards the achievement of the 
national mitigation contribution of the host 
country. Unless the units generated by that mit­
igation activity are explicitly accounted for in
the country’s inventory, double claiming will 
occur. This holds true not only for CDM-style in­
ternational standards or protocols, but also for 
voluntary standards. 
The Paris Agreement’s accounting framework 
will be elaborated in the coming years. As long 
as this as this task is not accomplished, it is al­
most impossible to avoid double claiming of 
emission reductions. For the use of internation­
al carbon markets, a robust accounting frame­
work is therefore a prerequisite. As long as 
there is no clarity on this issue, it is virtually im­
possible to adhere to ICAO’s own draft recom­
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6 Conclusions  
Under the UNFCCC, parties are preparing a new 
comprehensive global climate agreement to be 
adopted in Paris. However, this agreement is 
not going to cover two important sectors: in­
ternational aviation and shipping. Separate ne­
gotiations are ongoing under the dedicated UN 
bodies ICAO and IMO. This Policy Brief provided 
a short overview of the state of play of the ne­
gotiations in the aviation sector.
The negotiation process under ICAO 
Progress on addressing aviation emissions un­
der the ICAO has been slow. In 2010, ICAO 
agreed on an aspirational goal two cap net 
emission at 2020 levels, and to achieve carbon 
neutral growth after 2020. A basket of measures 
is to be considered to achieve this. A central 
role will be played by a yet-to-be-adopted 
global market-based measure (MBM), a manda­
tory offsetting scheme that will be used to
compensate for any excess emissions above the 
2020 baseline from 2021 onwards. 
The global MBM is supposed to be adopted at 
ICAO’s 39th Assembly in autumn 2016. Current­
ly, preparatory work is ongoing: The Environ­
mental Advisory Group (EAG) established under 
the ICAO Council oversees and coordinates the 
process and deals with the policy aspects. The 
question of how differentiation among devel­
oped and developing countries can be 
achieved without discriminating against aircraft 
carriers based on their country of origin is one 
of the core challenges to be addressed. Route­
based differentiation was proposed to solve 
this dilemma – obligations to offset emission
growth would be distributed equally among 
carriers serving the same route, irrespective of 
their country of origin.
Two technical committees are dealing with eli­
gibility criteria for the emission units (EUC) un­
der the scheme and provisions for measuring,
reporting and verification (MRV) respectively.
The two sub-groups have made substantial
progress and the current draft recommenda­
tions provide a solid basis for a robust manda­
tory offsetting scheme.  
Carefully design the governance structure 
What is yet missing, however, is more detailed 
provisions with respect to the governance 
structure for the scheme. Who gets to decide 
on the eligible offset programmes? How com­
pliance with the eligibility criteria ensured after 
a programme has been accredited? 
The experience of the CDM has shown that ad­
dressing these questions is key for maintaining 
the credibility and environmental integrity of
an offset crediting scheme. The transparency of 
the CDM’s governance framework allowed for a 
continuous reform process that ultimately led 
to robust procedures and methodologies that 
have been taken up not only at the internation­
al level, but also by many national offsetting 
schemes and by the voluntary carbon market.
If ICAO wants its global MBM to be credible 
over the long term, it thus needs to carefully
design the details of its offsetting schemes. Ei­
ther it establishes a permanent body following 
the example of the CDM Executive Board that 
continuously oversees the offsetting scheme.
As an alternative, it could allow ‘internationally 
accepted’ units only and leave oversight onto 















Supply is abundant 
Some have argued that ICAO should not restrict 
its supply too much by limiting itself to specific
offsets protocols. However, the experience with 
the CDM shows that fears over lack of demand 
and consequently high compliance costs are 
unfounded. Analysis shows that even the re­
maining CDM pipeline can supply more than 
the entire projected demand of international
aviation. 
Even if the CDM as a source of supply may not 
be available for international aviation, it still 
demonstrates the efficacy and proficiency with 
which offsetting schemes can operate. The 
CDM reached its peak of proficiency in 2012,
only eight years after the first projects had been 
registered. Substantial capacities exist and will 
prevail even in the event that the CDM will not
be continued after 2020. This includes, for ex­
ample, the CDM’s tools and methodologies that 
will remain in the public domain in any case. 
With sufficient lead time, there will be plenty of 
supply to satisfy the demand from international
aviation. 
The Paris Agreement: A fresh start for car­
bon markets? 
With the Paris Agreement on the horizon, glob­
al carbon markets suffered from a lot of uncer­
tainty. While the Paris Agreement does include 
provisions that allow for market-based mitiga­
tion, not much of the uncertainty was resolved.
The it remains to be seen if existing CDM pro­
jects, its tools and methodologies will be trans­
ferred to the newly established mechanism to 
“promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions while fostering sustainable develop­
ment”. Also, the nature of the national contribu­
tions will require an accounting framework 
fundamentally different from what we know 
from the world of the Kyoto Protocol. The as­
pect of the accounting framework has not yet 
been addressed in the negotiations of the Paris 
Agreement in any depth. This is one of the chal­
 
lenges that have to be worked out in the ‘fine 
print’ to the agreement that will have to be de­
veloped in the years to come.
The integrity of international carbon markets 
critically hinges on a robust accounting frame­
work. If certified emission reductions are not 
clearly accounted for in the inventories of the 
host countries, every mitigation activity will au­
tomatically contribute to complying with the 
host countries’ mitigation contribution / com­
mitment. Ultimately, this could lead to a situa­
tion in which emission reductions are claimed 
both by the host countries and the ICAO to­
wards achieving their mitigation goals, thus 
leading to double counting.
Take your time 
We therefore recommend that ICAO does not 
conclude the discussion on emission unit crite­
ria or even accredit certification programs or 
protocols to be eligible. While robust criteria
and a transparent accreditation process should 
form an integral part of the MBM decisions to 
be taken at ICAO’s 39th Assembly, ICAO should 
not prematurely designate any offset pro­
grammes / protocols before the issue of the ac­
counting framework under the Paris Agreement 
is resolved. While this may restrict the ability to 
contribute to ‘early action’ – much needed 
emission reductions in the time before 2020 – it
would also make sure that ICAO’s contribution 
to mitigating climate change is real and addi­
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